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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PnoCEss-RmHT OF CoNDBMNED PrusoNBR TO

lNsANITY-Petitioner was convicted of
murder in a Georgia court and sentenced to die by electrocution. He made application to the governor to postpone execution on the ground that he had become
insane after conviction. The governor, acting under authority of a state statute,1
appointed three physicians who conducted an examination of petitioner and found
A HEARING ON CLAIM OF SUPBRVBNING

1

Ga. Code (1935) §27-2602.
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him sane. Thereupon, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus-in a
state court contending that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
entitled him to a hearing on his insanity claim before a judicial or administrative
tribunal at w:hich he could offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be represented by counsel. Dismissal of his petition was affirmed by the state supreme
court.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed.
Georgia's action in constituting its governor as a special tribunal to make the
final determination regarding the sanity of a person about to be executed is not
a denial of due process of law. One justice dissented. Solesbee 11. Balcom, (U.S.
1950) 70 S.Ct. 457.
It is well settled both at common law3 and under the statutes4 of most states
that a prisoner condemned to die should not be put to death while insane.5
Whether or not the Federal Constitution affords any substantive protection against
violation by a state of this well-recognized principle is a question on which the
Supreme Court, heretofore at least, has never been required to rule. 6 The majority
of the Court, speaking through Justice Black, did not consider that issue necessarily raised by the principal case.7 However, the fact that the Court even
examined the procedure provided by Georgia for disposing of a supervening insanity claim, if only to £nd it adequate, would seem to justify an inference that
some manner of protection is embodied in the due process clause. The concept
of due process as a restraint upon the states in their administration of justice is
not necessarily con£ned to the rights of the accused at trial, but may extend
beyond to the execution of the sentence.8 An interpretation of the clause to
proscribe state action in putting to death an insane criminal might be justi£ed
on the ground that it offends a principle of justice "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."9 Among the state courts, however, the prevailing view is that
Solesbee v. Balcom, 205 Ga. 122, 52 S.W. (2d) 433 (1949).
CHI'lTY, CRIMINAL LAw, Earle ed., 525 (1819); 4 BLACKSTONB, CoMMENTARIBs,
1st ed., 396 (1765); I HAWKINS, PLEAS oF THE CnoWN 2 (1716).
4 The state statutes are collected in an appendix to the principal case at 456.
5 In general see 49 A.L.R. 804 (1927); Ann. Cas. 424 (1916E); 38 L.R.A. 577 (1898);
14 AM. Jtm. 804 (1938).
6 In Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87 (1897), the Court made it clear
that upon a mere suggestion of insanity the tribunal charged with responsibility must
necessarily be vested with a broad discretion in deciding whether evidence will be heard.
In Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 437, 68 S.Ct. 1131 (1948) the Court examined the California
procedure for raising the question of post-sentence insanity, but considered the due process
issue not ripe for decision. See note, 47 MicH. L. REv. 707 (1949).
7 Principal case at 458. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter, in a vigorous dissenting
opinion, maintained that the issue is necessarily raised by the principal case and "now almost
su,mmarily answered." Principal case at 460.
8 Thus, the Supreme Court has reviewed the circumstances under which a prisoner
was ab.out to be executed after having been once seated in the electric chair only to survive
the throwing of the switch because of mechanical defect. -Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 67 S.Ct. 374 (1947); 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 584 (1947); 22 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 270 (1947).
9 See language of Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 3-19 at 325, 58 S.Ct.
149 (1937); Green, ''The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court," 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1948). Execution of an insane criminal could be characterized as "cruel and inhuman punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment and
thus satisfy Justice Black's theory that the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the
2
3
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a prisoner, once duly convicted, has no constitutional right to a sanity hearing.
Nor is the procedure where such a hearing is held considered to be circumscribed
by the due process clause.10 If there is a constitutional right not to be executed
while insane, certainly only a strange and insubstantial kind of procedural due
process is required for its protection. The principal case dispels any inference
reasonably drawn from Phyle v. Duffy11 that due process requires a judicial
hearing.12 If an ex parte examination conducted under authority of the governor
at which the prisoner is not allowed to be represented by counsel or to offer evi~
dence, and from which he has no right of appeal, is held to be constitutionally
unobjectionable, it may be wondered what less in the way of procedural safe-guards would satisfy due process. Statutes in a majority of states provide that
upon a prima facie showing of insanity, execution will be suspended while a
hearing before a court or jury is held.13 A minority of states designate the
governor as final arbiter of a claim of supervening insanity, but in most of these
opportunity for an adversary hearing is apparently afforded.14 Gauged by the
principal case, such procedure would be adequate a fortiori. Only in a few states
is the disposition of such claim left entirely to the discretion of the governor as
part of his general executive power of pardon and reprieve, with no provision
for any kind of procedure whereby a claimant may be heard or examined.15 It
would seem that only in these jurisdictions could a case arise to test further the
scope of the constitutional right implicit in the principal case.

Robert P. Griffin, S.Ed.

Fourteenth Amendment. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947);
46 M:rCH. L. REv. 372 (1948).
10 Barrett v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 153, 259 S.W. 25 (1923); In re Smith, 25 N.M.
48, 176 P. 819 (1918); Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554, 28 S.E. 68 (1897); Ex parte Phyle,
30 Cal. (2d) 838, 186 P. (2d) 134 (1947). See collection of cases in 49 A.L.R. 804 (1927).
11 334 U.S. 437, 68 S.Ct. 1131 (1948).
12 See 47 MrcH. L. REv. 707 (1949).
l3 For example: Ala. Code Ann., tit. 15, §427 (1940); Colo. Stat. Ann., c. 48, §§6, 7
(1935); ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §§593, 594 (1949); La. Code Crim. Law & Proc. Ann. §267
(1943). In some states a hearing is granted as a matter of common law procedure. State v.
Bethune, 88 S.C. 401, 71 S.E. 29 (1911); Jordon v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327
. (1910); State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 58 P. 248 (1899). A comprehensive collection
of authorities is collected in an appendix to the principal case at 456.
14 Iowa Code (1946) §§792.5-792.7. In some of these states it appears to be uncertain
whether an opportunity to be heard is afforded. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§44-2307, 44-2309;
Fla. Stat. (1941) §922.07; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §2558.
15 Diamond v. State, 195 Ind. 285, 144 N.E. 466 (1924); Juggins v. Executive Council,
257 Mass. 386, 154 N.E. 72 (1926). In a number of states, there is no clear indication either
in the legislation or judicial decisions regarding the procedure to be followed, if any, in raising
a post-conviction claim of insanity. See appendix to principal case at 467.

